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Executive Summary 
Financial aid programs are supposed to improve access and affordability in higher education.  The 
effectiveness of these programs is increasingly being questioned as college attainment figures stag-
nate and the financial burden on students and families continues to climb year after year.  This re-
port identifies the main culprit for this unsatisfactory state of affairs as a misunderstanding of the 
effect of financial aid on schools.   
Currently, financial aid programs take costs per student as a given, and attempt to offset some of 
those costs.  However, costs are not given.  In fact, it is widely acknowledged that colleges and uni-
versities are engaged in an academic arms race.  Thus, when financial aid programs make more 
money available to schools, this money is spent and results in higher costs per student.  The end re-
sult is more costly higher education, generally accompanied by higher tuition, which has negative 
implications for access and affordability.   
Financial aid that is restricted to low-income students (allowing them to pay current costs at their 
school) will not materially contribute to the arms race.  The effect of such aid will be to improve ac-
cess, affordability and equality of opportunity.  However, when aid is made available to students who 
can already pay the current costs, the schools are likely to capture  the aid money and spend it – 
which contributes to the arms race.   
Thus, to avoid providing fuel for the arms race, financial aid needs to be well targeted.  Current finan-
cial aid programs generally do not meet this requirement.  State appropriations and other lump sum 
payments are particularly bad in this regard, as are the federal tax credits.  When income limits on 
federally backed loans exist, they are generally too high.  The only large program that does not con-
tribute to the arms race is the means-tested Pell grant program. 
This report therefore argues for the elimination of most current financial aid programs (including 
state appropriations) and for the creation of Super Pell grants.  A revised student loan program would 
likely be needed to fill any funding gap.  
Introduction 
The current financial aid system is broken in many respects.  The most widely recognized flaw is that 
a convoluted application and distribution system prevents those who need aid the most from getting 
it.  As a recent study from the Center for American Progress noted, the “primary difficulty with cur-
rent federal financial aid policy is that it is poorly understood by nearly all of its constituents.”1  This 
is indeed true, and reforms to address this issue are needed.  But I believe that there are problems 
that are much more fundamental in nature, and that these problems lend considerable support to 
the view that “financial aid has morphed into a ‘debt for diploma’ system that fosters ever-rising tui-
tions, fees, and room-and-board charges.”2 
Currently, financial aid programs look at what it costs to educate a student (the per student costs), 
and then devise methods of reducing the out of pocket expenditure for students and their families.  
This largely consists of giving money directly to schools (state appropriations) or giving money to stu-
dents to give to schools (grants and student loans).  These programs should, in theory, be effective, 
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but mounting evidence suggests that they are not.   
The key to understanding why they are ineffective is to realize that “colleges and universities will re-
act to the incentives those policies create and not passively accept their consequences… There is 
every reason to expect that both prices and financial aid practices would respond to such incentives 
in ways that would lead to the colleges themselves capturing a significant fraction of the revenues.”3  
The failure to recognize this is the main flaw of the existing theory of financial aid.  Once this mistake 
is acknowledged, it becomes apparent that current financial aid practices are not likely to be as effec-
tive as first thought.   
Perhaps the most important reason why current financial aid programs are ineffective is that they 
often indirectly lead to higher costs per student.  The notion that financial aid programs can contrib-
ute to higher costs flows quite logically from the following three observations.  First, any additional 
resources obtained by a school will be spent.  The lack of measures of output means that schools are 
forced to compete largely on inputs, and since inputs are costly, schools have an insatiable thirst for 
more resources (this has been described as the Bowen Rule or the Cookie Monster Principle).  Sec-
ond, much of financial aid is structured in such a way that schools can obtain additional resources.  
Third, the spending of additional resources results in higher costs per student. 
From these observations, it follows that current financial aid practices contribute to the arms race in 
spending, which leads to higher costs.  These higher costs are often accompanied by higher tuition, 
which reduces access and affordability – the exact opposite of what the programs intend.   
Moreover, much of the money is spent in ways that have questionable impact on education.  As 
Ronald Ehrenberg notes, “competitive pressures have caused their focus… to widen,” as each school, 
“strives to maintain or improve its position.”4  This loss of focus has unfortunate consequences.  To 
paraphrase William Easterly, if you try to do everything and focus on nothing, and if you obsess about 
money raised rather than results achieved, haven’t you already told us that the money will not be “well 
spent”?5  
Thus, the current theory of financial aid, which takes costs per student as given and attempts to off-
set them, is incomplete because costs per student are determined in part by financial aid.  In other 
words, because current financial aid practices contribute to the cost explosion we’ve witnessed in 
higher education, we cannot assume that costs are fixed.  The assumption that costs are not affected 
by aid is the fundamental flaw with financial aid as it is currently practiced.   
Below, I will explain in more detail how financial aid is supposed to work in theory and why it doesn’t 
work that way in practice.  I conclude by offering a recommendation for reform that will achieve the 
goals of the financial aid system more effectively than is currently the case. 
How Financial Aid Is Supposed to Work 
Financial aid has three main objectives: to increase access (enroll more students), to increase afforda-
bility (make higher education cheaper for students and their families), and to promote equality of op-
portunity (make sure disadvantaged students can go to school).  We will take these goals as a given, 
and examine the effectiveness of actual financial aid policies in achieving them.  Current financial aid 
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policies are designed to subsidize, 
or lower the cost to the student of 
attending college.  As Ronald 
Ehrenburg notes, “the total sub-
sidy the students receive consists 
of two parts: grant aid that goes 
only to grant recipients and a gen-
eral subsidy that every student re-
ceives.”6  The general subsidy typi-
cally takes the form of state appro-
priations for public schools and 
endowment financed spending at 
private schools (for those private 
schools with large endowments).  
The grant subsidy typically takes 
the form of scholarships and 
grants to students, often restricted 
to students from low-income fami-
lies, but increasingly based upon 
some sort of merit criteria.  There is an additional type of aid, student loans, that has taken on in-
creasing importance.  While students are not required to repay grants or scholarships, they are re-
quired to pay back student loans, so this is more properly thought of as affecting the timing of pay-
ment (interest notwithstanding) rather than the amount paid.7 
In reality, student financial aid is a complex web of individual programs that would be near impossi-
ble to disentangle and analyze in their entirety.  To see the logic behind financial aid, it will help to 
make some simplifying assumptions.  First, we’ll simplify the types of aid into state appropriations 
(subsides to schools), federal loans, and federal grants (like the Pell).  Since these are the biggest pro-
grams anyway, this assumption will greatly simplify the analysis without losing too much essential 
detail.  We’ll further simplify matters by focusing on one representative school.  The school charges 
everyone attending the same price (tuition).  That price is equal to the cost to the school (which is as-
sumed to be constant) of providing educational services.  The number of people qualified to go to col-
lege is related to family income, such that as the price of college decreases, more families will be able 
to afford to send their children to college.  For the purposes of this analysis, it doesn’t matter how 
“qualified” is defined (i.e., it could be a subset of the population or everyone who turns 18).   
The implications of these assumptions are depicted in figure 1. 
There is a normal downward sloping demand curve (D) (as the price of college decreases, more people 
will be able to afford to go, resulting in an increase in quantity demanded), and a perfectly elastic 
supply curve (S) determined by the cost (C) to the school of providing education per student.  In the 
absence of government intervention, QN students will go to college, and will pay tuition TN, which is 
equal to the cost (C). 
State governments decide that more students should be attending college (i.e., that QN is too small).  
$
C= TN
QN
S
D
Q max Students
Figure 1:  Higher Education with No Financial Aid 
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For the most part, “states 
have chosen to promote col-
lege enrollment by keeping tui-
tion low through across-the-
board subsidies rather than 
using more targeted, means-
tested aid.”8  In the 1990s, over 
90% of state funding for higher 
education took this form, 
though today this figure is 
likely lower as more states 
adopt programs that give schol-
arships directly to students 
(such as the Georgia HOPE 
scholarship). 
We will call this across the 
board subsidy an 
“appropriation.”  For simplicity, 
we will assume that all state subsidies are of this lump sum nature, and go directly to the school to 
offset costs.  This subsidy is often paired with a form of price control that limits the tuition that the 
school can charge.  The idea is that given the cost per student, a subsidy to the school will shift the 
supply curve down (from S to SA) since the loss in tuition per student is exactly covered by the sub-
sidy.  Graphically, this has the effect of shifting the supply curve down by the amount of the per stu-
dent subsidy (A) as shown in figure 2.  The shaded area represents the total state appropriation.   
The new intersection of the demand and supply curves implies the number of students able to attend 
college increased by an amount equal to difference between QA and QN, and that students now pay 
tuition of TA.  Note that the school is still receiving its cost of educating a student (C), but that stu-
dents are paying less than the school is receiving ( TA < C = TA + A). 
Note that there still is a segment of college capable individuals who cannot afford to attend college 
even at the new subsidized price (those from QA<Q<Qmax).  The federal government notices this and 
decides to implement two programs.  First they give low-income students loans so that they too can 
attend college.  Thus for the subset of the population that cannot afford to attend, the federal govern-
ment offers loans which augment their ability to pay for college.  The result of this action is depicted 
in figure 3.   
For simplicity, we assume the loans are made available to those who could not afford to attend in the 
absence of either state or federal intervention (everyone past QN).  The loans have the effect of pivot-
ing the demand curve at QN implying that D becomes DL.  Note however, that because the loans allow 
more students to attend college, the lump sum state subsidy is spread over more students, reducing 
the subsidy per student (the supply curve shifts up from SA to SL).  The intersection of DL and SL im-
plies that QL students now attend college, each paying tuition TL.  The loan program has the effect of 
enabling QL – QA more students to attend college, and also reduces the financial strain for some stu-
$
C= TN
C-A= TA
QN QA
S
SA
D
Qmax
Students
Figure 2:  Higher Education with State Appropriations 
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dents (those where QN < Q < QA).  
While the total amount of loans 
is equal to the triangle XYZ, the 
direct cost to the federal gov-
ernment is smaller, since only a 
portion of the loans come di-
rectly from the government 
(this is one of the attractive fea-
tures of loans compared to 
grants).9 
However, there are still quali-
fied individuals who are unable 
to afford college (QL < Qmax).  
Thus another federal program 
is initiated, which gives grants 
to students from very low-
income households.  The grant 
for each student is the amount 
needed to enable them to afford 
to attend.  The effects of this 
program are illustrated in figure 4.   
Again, because more students 
are attending college, the state 
subsidy per student has de-
clined, shifting the supply 
curve up (from SL to SE).  The 
demand curve is the same until 
it intersects SE at which point 
the grants kick in, which ren-
der the curve horizontal there-
after.  Thus the final demand 
curve DE has two kinks result-
ing in three different slopes.  
The first section (from 0 to QN) 
is the same as the original de-
mand curve D.  The second 
section (from QN to QF is the 
same as the second demand 
curve DL.  And the last section 
(from QF to Qmax) is horizontal 
along the supply curve SE.    
$
C= TN
C-A= TA
QN QA
S
Sa
D
SL
DE
C-AL= TL
SE
Qmax
C-AE= TE
DL
QF
Students
Figure 4: Higher Education with State Appropriations, 
Loans, and Means-tested Grants 
$
C= TN
C-A= TA
QN QL
S
SA
D
SLC-AL= TL
Qmax
DL
QA
X
Z
Y
Students
Figure 3: Higher Education with State Appropriations and 
Loans 
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Thus, after the lump sum state subsidy, federal loans, and federal grants are taken into account, the 
intersection of DE and SE implies that Qmax students are going to college, each paying tuition TE (with 
all students after QN receiving loans and/or grant aid).  The school receives not only TE from each 
student, but also AE which, when combined, equal C, the cost of educating a student (which is equal 
to the initial tuition TN). 
This, in vastly simplified form, is the logic behind the current financial aid programs, and in theory, it 
is wonderful.  Given sufficient funding, it ensures that all who are qualified can attend college, while 
at the same time ensuring resources per student are not reduced (implying that the quality of educa-
tion does not suffer).  In reality however, there are some problems. As David Altig, senior vice presi-
dent and research director at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta says, “what works in theory some-
times works in practice.”10  This is not one of those times.   
Theory Meets Reality 
Sources:  Digest of Education Statistics, College Board, SHEEO, NOTE: The chart starts in 1986 be-
cause that is the first year for which data is available for all of the variables.  Note that the enrollment 
and spending lines stop in 2005, and the tuition line in 2006.  There is also a gap in the spending 
line.   Federal Aid and State Appropriations are total figures, while Tuition and Spending (Public) are 
per student. 
Figure 5:  Financial Aid, Enrollment, Spending and Tuition, 1986-2007  
90
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The original theory of financial aid would predict that the increases in federal aid and state appro-
priations over the last twenty years should primarily affect enrollments and affordability.  Figure 5 
shows the trends over time for a number of variables (inflation adjusted where appropriate), each of 
which is indexed using 1986 as the base year.  Since 1986, federal aid has nearly tripled, while state 
appropriations (total, not per student) have increased by slightly more than 40 percent.  But enroll-
ments at both two and four year schools have only increased by about 40 percent.  If one looks at 
graduates, rather than enrollments, the figures are even worse.  Moreover, the financial burden on 
students, as measured by the level of tuition and required fees, has almost doubled, as has spending 
per student.   
Thus, there appears to be a disconnect between theory and reality.  The clue as to what is wrong with 
the original theory lies in the spending line, which has been increasing.  Essentially, what the re-
mainder of this analysis will argue is that viewing costs (spending) as fixed, and designing financial 
aid programs to address those costs is inappropriate, because we should expect one of the conse-
quences of the financial aid programs to be changes in the level of costs. 
Flaws in the Theory 
It is easy to appreciate the simplicity of the model laid out above.  But that simplicity comes at the 
cost of ignoring two important concepts, competition and price discrimination, that significantly alter 
the results.  To be clear, this is not an attack on simplifying assumptions.  In fact, I’m in agreement 
with the views of recent economics Nobel laureate Paul Krugman who says: 
I am a strong believer in the importance of models, which… greatly extend the power and 
range of our insight. In particular, I have no sympathy for those people who criticize the unre-
alistic simplifications of model-builders …  The point is to realize that economic models are 
metaphors, not truth …   But always remember that you may have gotten the metaphor 
wrong, and that someone else with a different metaphor may be seeing something that you 
are missing.11 
Thus, my objection to ignoring these concepts is not that it is unrealistic to do so, but that their ex-
clusion significantly alters the conclusions one draws about the effectiveness of the financial aid sys-
tem.   
Competition among Schools 
The first concept that is not adequately appreciated in the model above is that there is intense com-
petition among schools.  Higher education is different from most other industries, because most uni-
versities and colleges are either public or non-profit, implying that they are not competing for profit 
per se.  But they do compete with each other along other dimensions, including, notably, prestige.   
Price Discrimination 
The second thing that is not properly accounted for in the logic of financial aid outlined above is the 
concept of price discrimination or tuition discounting.  By charging students different amounts based 
on their ability to pay, schools are able to collect more money from their students.  Thus, a “class of 
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students may resemble the passengers of an airliner in the variability of payments they have made 
for the same service.”12   
Moreover, price discrimination has become more common.  A new report from the Delta Cost Project 
noted a “prominent trend in the past two decades has been growing use of ‘tuition discounting’ as a 
recruitment tool and as a mechanism for generating funds for student aid.”13  In The Student Aid 
Game, Michael S. McPherson and Morton Owen Schapiro argue that many schools “now regard stu-
dent aid as a vital revenue management and enrollment management tool….  The school sets out de-
liberately to shape a financial aid strategy that maximally advances the combined (and conflicting) 
goals of admitting the best students and gaining as much revenue from them as possible.”14  They 
term this strategic maximization, and note that while certainly not all schools are doing it, “it is fair 
to say … that most institutions have moved their financial aid operations … significantly toward the 
strategic maximization camp.”15 
This led one former university president to conclude that “[s]tudent aid has become little more than a 
clever marketing mechanism that permits colleges to maximize tuition dollars through rampant price 
discrimination.”16 
Together, these concepts of competition and price discrimination significantly alter our conclusions 
about the effectiveness of the financial aid system in achieving its goals. 
Unintended Consequences:  Ravenous Cookie Monsters Engaged in an Arms Race  
Fundamentally, there are unintended consequences of the current financial aid system because from 
the perspective of competing schools, it does not make sense to take their costs, subtract the state 
subsidy per student, and charge the remainder in tuition (some of the money for which comes from 
grants and loans to students).  Schools have an incentive to spend as much as possible, because 
spending is useful in building a better school (or at least what appears to be a better school).  In 
other settings, this impulse would be controlled by the need to justify the costs on some sort of cost-
benefit grounds.  But in higher education, there are very few good measures of outcomes (student 
learning and its impact in a value added sense), and those that do exist are not widely used.  This 
renders cost-benefit analysis exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.  As a result, anything that has a 
plausible claim to being beneficial will be attempted if money is available.  Thus, schools have an in-
satiable need for more money. 
The ravenous need of schools for money was originally described as “Bowen’s Rule - All universities, 
and in particular major institutions with or seeking elite status, will use any and all funds they re-
ceive for the pursuit of perceived excellence and improvement.”17  Bowen’s Rule has been confirmed 
by others such as Charles Clotfelter, who, as Rupert Wilkinson noted, showed that colleges 
“increased their prices and general spending because they could get away with it – not to make 
money in itself but to buy the best of nearly everything.” (Emphasis original)18 
Ronald Ehrenberg put this same concept much more amusingly in Tuition Rising: Why College Costs 
So Much:   
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Administrators of selective private colleges and universities also want to maximize the value of 
their institutions.  However, for them value is not measured by economic profits… Rather, 
maximizing value to these administrators means making their institutions the very best that 
they can be in almost every area of their activities.  These administrators are like cookie mon-
sters… They seek out all the resources that they can get their hands on and then devour 
them.19 
While spending money in the pursuit of excellence by universities sounds great—who doesn’t like ex-
cellence—there is the downside that whatever they spend has to come from somewhere.  Indeed, the 
expenditure of additional resources is the same thing as raising the cost per student.  Thus, if the 
financial aid system allows for schools to acquire additional resources, it will have the effect of raising 
costs per student.  In other words, viewing the problem as how to distribute financial aid, given the 
costs of providing an education is inappropriate when costs are partly determined by the financial aid 
system. 
Is there reason to suspect that the current financial aid system will lead to higher costs?  Yes. 
The first step in coming to this conclusion involves the realization that one of the main ways in which 
schools compete with each other is on quality.  But since outputs are not measured, competition fo-
cuses on inputs, on the assumption that high quality inputs will lead to better outputs.  High quality 
inputs are attracted by prestige.  A more prestigious school will attract better students who yearn to 
attend the best schools, attract a better staff (including more distinguished faculty) increase dona-
tions from proud alumni, and confirm that the school is doing a great job in the eyes of society: 
It has been shown that when an institution’s ranking in U.S. News & World Report improves, 
the number of applicants increases and the percentage of applicants accepted decreases, 
while yield and freshmen test scores increase, and the amount of financial aid that must be 
offered to enroll the class decreases. As a result, institutions have every incentive to improve 
their ranking. To the extent that the rankings are partially based on how much an institution 
spends educating each student, pressure to increase such spending mounts, and unilateral 
reduction of costs in a number of areas is untenable.20 
One of the surest ways to increase prestige is to spend more money.  In fact, one of the components 
in the U.S. News & World Report (USNWR) rankings is simply educational spending per student, with 
a higher ranking for schools that spend more.  Spending is very helpful in improving other aspects 
that comprise most rankings as well.     
If a school is able to acquire additional resources, it will spend more money to improve itself.  This is 
beneficial for the school because a more prestigious school will attract more students, some of whom 
will be from wealthy families who can afford to pay high tuitions.  This relationship between price and 
prestige helps explain why “pricing among major research universities is increasingly influenced by 
levels of market  tolerance, and a convergence in pricing driven in part by the perception that price 
confers quality and a corresponding level of prestige to consumers.”21   
This beneficial consequence of increasing prestige is illustrated in figure 6.   
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The left side panel introduces what we’ll call the “Prestige Curve.”  The prestige curve maps the rela-
tionship between the amount of resources, or spending, per student and the perceived quality of the 
school.  As resources (spending) per student increases, the school is able to do any number of things 
that make the school appear to be of higher quality, such as hire world-renowned faculty, improve 
the sports program, beautify the campus, or build country-club style amenities and dorms. 
By enabling a school to spend more money per student, the school moves up the prestige curve (from 
point X to Y on the left panel).  By moving up the prestige curve, the school becomes more attractive 
to students.  Because each school is competing over the same body of students, this has the effect of 
raising the demand curve for that particular school, as shown in the right side panel.  Essentially, a 
more prestigious school will be able to attract a greater number of prospective students, some of 
whom will be able to pay higher tuition.  Since the capacity of a school is largely fixed in the short 
run, say at QC, the effect of this higher demand is to increase the number of students who are capa-
ble of paying higher tuition.  This can start a virtuous cycle.  If the school with a good reputation 
chooses to, students paying full tuition can replace those who received institutional discounts thanks 
to the higher demand for the school.  This will provide even more money for the school to use on im-
provements, which will move it higher up the prestige curve, which will attract more students…  It 
should be noted that this cycle can turn vicious.  Imagine, for example, a scandal that only temporar-
ily damages a school’s prestige (such as the recent Duke lacrosse team incident).  The lower prestige 
makes the school less attractive to applicants.  If this results in fewer students paying full tuition, 
this could spark a vicious cycle.  Because more students would require tuition discounts, there is 
less money to spend per student on other things, which lowers prestige even further, which lowers 
demand again…   
While spending more resources per student sounds like a fine idea, we need to remember that nearly 
all expenditures by schools will ultimately come from either students in the form of tuition, or tax-
payers in the form of government support. 
Prestige Curve
Resources
Per 
Student
Perceived Quality Students
$
QC
DY
DX
X
Y
School Z
Figure 6:  The Prestige Curve and Demand 
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Once we introduce the notion of competition among schools, we realize that all schools are trying to 
engage in the same behavior.  This insatiable thirst for ever more money by schools can be thought of 
as an academic arms race:   
The objective of selective academic institutions is to be the best they can in every aspect of 
their activities. They aggressively seek out all  possible  resources  and  put  them  to  use 
funding  things  they  think  will  make  them better. To look better than their competitors, 
the  institutions  wind  up  in  an  arms  race  of spending  to  improve  facilities,  faculty,  
students, research, and instructional technology.22 
It should be noted that the “U.S. News rankings exacerbate this problem. With 30 percent of the 
rankings based directly or indirectly on expenditures, colleges are rewarded for prying more money 
out of students and parents and then spending it, regardless of whether they spend it well.”23   
Moreover, this behavior is not limited to selective schools.  Because the accomplishments of the best 
schools often “force other universities, state and private, to seek to emulate the high standards that 
they set”24 this arms race mentality is present at almost every school.  Ask yourself, how many 
schools are there, that, if they found a bag of money, would not find some way to spend it in hopes of 
maintaining or improving their position?     
One of the effects of this arms race is to increase the baseline cost of providing an education.  In the 
framework used here, increasing prestige has the side effect of driving up the cost of educating each 
student.  As shown in figure 7, when schools increase their prestige, costs also increase. 
Graphically, moving from X to Y in the left panel implies an increase from CX to CY on the right panel.  
Aggregating over schools, this implies that the supply curve is shifting from SX to SY.  Without a 
change in demand for college in general (as opposed to a change in demand for a specific college), this 
will drive up tuition for everyone and increase the number of students needing federal loans and 
grants, as well as the amount of aid they require. 
Prestige Curve
Resources
Per 
Student
Perceived Quality Students
$
CY
CXX
Y SY
SX
All Schools
Figure 7:  The Prestige Curve and Costs 
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So while moving up the prestige curve results in higher perceived quality, it also results in higher 
costs per student, which in turn lead to higher tuition.  Thus, to the extent that our financial aid sys-
tem contributes to the academic arms race, it makes college less affordable by increasing costs and 
therefore tuition, which is the exact opposite of its intended purpose. 
From where do schools get 
additional money?  A num-
ber of sources are possible.  
Some programs produce 
surpluses that can be used 
elsewhere: “In areas such 
as business, academic lead-
ers have clearly set out to 
generate income above real 
costs, which is then in-
vested to further academic 
quality and prestige.”25   
Another source of additional 
revenue that has become 
fairly common is price dis-
crimination against stu-
dents from middle- and 
high-income families.  By 
practicing price discrimina-
tion —charging different students different sums for the same educational service — schools can in-
crease their revenue.  If the students that are capable of paying more are made to do so, a school can 
increase its revenue, allowing it to spend more, moving it up the prestige curve.  Remarkably, the fed-
eral government actually encourages price discrimination by sharing students’ personal financial in-
formation contained in the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) with the schools.  This 
detailed knowledge on the finances of students makes it much easier for schools to price discrimi-
nate.   
Moreover, it is not just the elite schools that are price discriminating.  The University of Phoenix re-
cently admitted “that it sets its tuition with the loan limits in mind.”26  And a report from the Delta 
Cost Project noted that: “Among public institutions, sticker prices routinely increased less than gross 
tuition revenues. This happens because more public institutions are using differential pricing to cap-
ture greater increases in tuition from students other than in-state undergraduates.”27 
In other words, all types of schools are ravenous for money to spend on things that will make the 
school better and more prestigious.  Increasing tuition and then practicing price discrimination is one 
way for them to get more revenue.     
Figure 8 shows the mechanics of price discrimination, which are fairly simple, especially once the 
FAFSA information is given to schools by the government.  All a school needs to do is establish a very 
S
SE TR=DE
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QN Q MaxQF
$
Students
C
C-AE =TE 
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Tuition 
Discounts / 
Institutional Aid 
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P
Figure 8:  Price Discrimination 
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high tuition, Tmax and give everyone who can’t pay that much a discount on tuition (institutional aid).  
Assuming perfect price discrimination, the tuition charged varies by ability to pay and follows the de-
mand curve.  Thus, schools continue to charge a net tuition of TE to those students unable to pay 
more (those from QF to Qmax), but they charge everyone else exactly what they are able to pay.  As a 
result, the schools receive additional revenue equal to the area UVWY.  This area represents money 
that used to be kept by students, but that is now funneled to the schools in the form of higher reve-
nues instead, benefiting the schools at the expense of their students.  The area ULPWV represents 
the amount of discounts on tuition, or institutional aid given to students.  However, the total amount 
given in tuition discounts should not be viewed as indicative of the schools generosity, since they can 
increase this area by just raising their published tuition and offsetting it with higher “aid.”   
Price discrimination also allows the schools to capture part of the state subsidy.  The lump sum state 
subsidy was designed to lower the tuition for all students, but when schools price discriminate, lump 
sum subsidies do not result in lower tuition for many students.  While the subset of students from QF 
to Qmax benefit from the subsidy, students from 0 to QN receive no benefit from the subsidy, and stu-
dents from QN to QF only benefit from part of the subsidy.  Thus, of the entire subsidy, only a fraction 
is effective in the sense that it makes college more affordable for students.  Meanwhile, the portion 
represented by XVWY is ineffective in lowering the tuition for students, and is “captured” by the 
schools.  In fact, when schools price discriminate, they actually receive that area twice, once in the 
form of a subsidy from the state, and again in the form of tuition from the students.   
It should be emphasized that the main flaw in the existing model is its inability to capture the impli-
cations for costs of competition among schools.  The lesser issue of price discrimination is empha-
sized in this study mainly because of its impact on a stated goal of financial aid (to reduce the finan-
cial burden of college), and for the fact that it can also serve as a catalyst for the academic arms race, 
though it is by no means alone in serving that function.   
Thus, the original theory is in need of revision.  Instead of taking costs per student as given, the re-
vised theory notes that financial aid can be expected, under certain circumstances, to lead to an in-
crease in costs per student.  Specifically, whenever aid is made available to students who are already 
paying existing costs, it will increase their ability to pay, which is noted by colleges who in turn in-
crease the price they charge these students.  The revenue is spent to improve the school, with the 
consequence that costs per student increase.  This increase in costs is typically accompanied by an 
increase in tuition, which has negative consequences for affordability and access.   
Before moving on, I should point out that I am not the first to put forward a critique of the financial 
aid system.  In fact, quite a few people precede me: 
• “If anything, increases in financial aid in recent years have enabled colleges and universities 
blithely to raise their tuitions, confident that Federal loan subsidies would help cushion the 
increase.”28   
• “One result of the federal government’s student financial aid programs is higher tuition costs 
at our nation’s colleges and universities.”29 
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• “Ironically, federal programs in totality give incentive for institutions to increase tuition and to 
set high sticker prices.”30 
• “Each institution faces the choice of maintaining tuition at the lowest possible level or of rais-
ing tuitions to ‘harvest’ the federal student aid as an indirect institutional subsidy.”31   
The first statement is all the more remarkable because it was coming from the Secretary of Education 
at the time, and later came to be known as the Bennett Hypothesis.  It is perhaps the most widely 
known critique of the financial aid system.  The argument is that financial aid would increase the 
ability of students to pay, but that schools would see this and either (1) raise tuition; or (2) cut back 
on their own aid.  “Previous studies with evidence pertinent to the Bennett hypothesis are suggestive. 
McPherson and Shapiro (1991), Turner (1997), Li (1999), Netz (1999), Acosta (2001), and Long (2002) 
all find evidence that tuition rises for at least some segments of the higher education market”32  
Other studies also offer mixed evidence.33,34   Overall, “[e]stimates of the size of this “Bennett Hypothe-
sis” at public institutions range from negligible to a $50 increase in tuition for every $100 increase in 
aid.”35 
The claim in this report (that financial aid often leads to higher spending per student), while similar 
to the Bennett Hypothesis, is different from it in two important respects.  First, the focus here is on 
the interaction between aid and spending, rather than aid and tuition.  The next step, higher spend-
ing leading to higher tuition, is a perfectly logical result, but there could be other complicating fac-
tors, such as a cap on tuition rates (or their growth) imposed by state legislatures, which prevent this 
from occurring. 
The second way in which this report differs from the Bennett Hypothesis is that it is explicit about 
when the effect occurs (and the types of aid likely to suffer from it).  Specifically, aid will fuel in-
creases in spending when it is given to students whose ability and willingness to pay is in excess of 
current costs at the school.  Because costs and ability to pay vary by school, this implies that a much 
more nuanced view is warranted.  The same aid program can have different effects based on the 
characteristics of the school and the students attending.  For instance, an extreme view of the Ben-
nett Hypothesis holds that the supply curve is perfectly inelastic and predicts that all student loan 
money will be harvested by the school, whereas the model here predicts that only part of that money 
will be harvested.  Thus, lumping all federal aid together when analyzing its impact, or even all aid of 
a given type, is unlikely to yield accurate results.  Unfortunately, public data on aid is generally only 
available in aggregate form (not student specific), which limits the extent to which we can analyze 
these issues.    
Evidence that the New Theory of Financial Aid is Correct 
The main argument in this analysis is that current financial aid practices contribute to ever increas-
ing costs in higher education in ways that the original model does not anticipate.  This conclusion is 
theoretically sound in that it flows directly from the model above, but does it accurately reflect real-
ity?  To answer that question, we’ll examine the data to see if some of the stepping-stones and predic-
tions of the new theory are valid.     
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Figure 9:  The Real Prestige Curve  
Figure 10:  Reputation and Applications per Enrollee 
Source:  IPEDS, USNWR, Note that observations were perturbed to reduce overlap. 
Source:  IPEDS, USNWR, Note that observations were perturbed to pre-
vent overlap and schools spending more than $150,000 per student 
were excluded. 
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Is the Prestige Curve Real and Does More Prestige Lead to An Increase in Demand? 
If my new model is to replace the current one, the first thing to be verified is the existence of the pres-
tige curve, which maps the relationship between resources (spending) per student and perceived 
quality.  There is not a perfect measure of a subjective notion like perceived quality, but a good proxy 
is the Peer Assessment of schools in the USNWR college rankings.36 This is basically the esteem in 
which university leaders hold each school.  We’ll call it the “Reputation Score” for clarity and simplic-
ity.  Figure 9 maps out the actual prestige curve, with spending per student on the y-axis and per-
ceived quality, as measured by the USNWR reputation score on the x-axis.  As you can see, the more 
a school spends, the higher the perceived quality of the school, on average.  The trend line can be 
thought of as the ‘prestige curve’ from figure 7, and indicates that if one school spends around 
$30,000 more per student than another, its reputation score is likely to be one point higher, though 
it should be pointed out that there is considerable variation, with some low spending schools ranked 
highly and some high spending schools ranked low.  Nevertheless, this relationship lends consider-
able weight to the idea of a prestige curve. 
The next issue in need of verification is that more prestigious schools will see an increase in demand.  
The number of applications that a school receives per spot is a reasonable measure of the demand for 
that school.  Figure 10 shows the relationship between our measure of prestige, the USNWR reputa-
tion score, and the applications per enrollee.  If a school has a reputation score that is one point 
higher than another, it is likely to get around 2.4 more applications per enrollee.  Again it should be 
pointed out that there is considerable variation, but that in general, more prestigious schools tend to 
have higher demand.   
Does Price Discrimination Allow Schools to Capitalize on the Increase in Demand and Increase Tuition? 
With both the prestige curve and the increase in demand associated with gaining prestige verified, 
the next issue to examine is price discrimination. The first step in price discrimination is to set a high 
price.  Figures 11 and 12 show that schools with higher demand, as indicated by the applications per 
enrollee, tend to charge higher tuition rates.   In general, an increase of one application per enrollee 
is associated with $126 in higher tuition at public schools, and $1,712 at private schools.  It is not 
surprising that the increase is less at public schools, which typically receive significant revenue from 
their state governments with the goal of keeping tuition low.  Note, however, that there are schools, 
generally those in the lower right hand corners, that could price discriminate but choose not to.     
The second step in price discrimination requires charging lower prices to those that cannot afford the 
“sticker” price.  Since fewer and fewer students can afford to pay the published tuition as the tuition 
level is increased, schools that are price discriminating will give more students “institutional grants,” 
which are essentially tuition discounts.  Thus, if schools were price discriminating, we would expect 
to see those schools with higher published tuition offering higher average institutional aid. 
Figures 13 and 14 show the relationship between the tuition rate and the average amount of institu-
tional aid, and confirm that as tuition is raised, schools tend to give more institutional aid.  On aver-
age, when tuition is increased by $1, the typical public school increases the average institutional 
grant by 13 cents, and the typical private school increases the average institutional grant by 47 
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Figure 11:  Tuition and Applications at Public Schools 
Source:  IPEDS, Note that only four-year public schools with FTE 
enrollment greater than 500, tuition between 1 and 12,000, and 
applications per enrollee less than 10 were included. 
Figure 12:  Tuition and Applications at Private Schools 
Source:  IPEDS, Note that only four-year private schools with FTE 
enrollment greater than 500, tuition between 1 and 40,000, and 
applications per enrollee less than 15 were included. 
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Figure 13:  Tuition Discounting at Public Schools 
Source:  IPEDS, Note that only four-year public schools with FTE en-
rollment greater than 500, tuition between 1 and 12,000, and average 
institutional aid of less than 6000 were included. 
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Figure 14:  Tuition Discounting at Private Schools 
Source:  IPEDS, Note that only four-year private schools with FTE en-
rollment greater than 500, tuition between 1 and 40,000, and average 
institutional aid of less than 20,000 were included. 
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Figure 15:  Tuition and Tuition Revenue at Public Schools 
Source:  IPEDS, Note that only four-year public schools with FTE en-
rollment greater than 500, tuition between 1 and 15,000, and tuition 
revenue of less than 15,000 were included. 
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Figure 16:  Tuition and Tuition Revenue at Private Schools 
Source:  IPEDS, Note that only four year private schools with FTE en-
rollment greater than 500, tuition between 1 and 40,000, and tuition 
revenue of less than 30,000 were included. 
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cents.  These figures are consistent with price discrimination. 
One issue that complicates figures 13 and 14 is that a school’s choices concerning institutional aid 
are fairly complex.  Most schools provide need-based aid, but many also provide merit-based aid.37  
Thus, it is difficult to tell whether high priced institutions offer more institutional aid in order to off-
set higher tuition, or whether they are trying to attract high quality students through merit awards.   
Does Price Discrimination Result in Higher Revenue for Schools? 
As figure 8, indicates, when schools are price discriminating, we would expect for tuition revenue per 
student to increase with the tuition rate, but at less than a one for one rate, since the school will 
need to provide more institutional aid.  Figures 15 and 16 show the relationship between published 
tuition and tuition revenue per student.  We see that, in general, a higher published tuition rate does 
lead to higher tuition revenue per student, but that increasing published tuition by $1 will only result 
in an average of $0.37 more in tuition revenue at public schools, and $0.51 more at private schools.     
To summarize, we can basically work backwards from figures 15 and 16.  Schools are “cookie mon-
sters” when it comes to resources, always desperate for money so that they can better themselves.  
Obviously, one of the ways to get more money is to charge a higher tuition (figures 15 and 16).  But 
in order to charge a higher tuition, you need to increase demand (figures 11 and 12) and to increase 
demand you need to bolster your reputation (figures 9 and 10).  
The Impact of Current Financial Aid Programs on College Affordability  
The previous section demonstrated that there is considerable evidence that the prestige curve is real 
and that price discrimination is practiced and results in higher revenue for schools.  Incorporating 
these concepts into the theory of financial aid results in very different predications about the effec-
tiveness of current financial aid practices than what we would expect if they were not an issue.  Since 
financial aid programs are typically justified based on increasing college affordability, access, and 
equality of opportunity, we will examine the effectiveness of existing programs on each of these.   
State Appropriations 
The original theory takes costs as given, and argues that state appropriations will partially offset tui-
tion.  This implies that net tuition (the actual price that students pay) will decrease by one dollar for 
every dollar increase in state appropriations.  The revised theory claims that state appropriations will 
affect costs, meaning that costs cannot be taken as given.  It claims that because state appropria-
tions often result in increased costs, net tuition will not decrease by a full dollar for every dollar in-
crease in state appropriations.   
One interesting factoid is that net tuition (the price students pay – sticker price minus grant aid)38 is 
actually higher when state appropriations per student are higher.  In fact, every dollar of state appro-
priations is associated with a net tuition 77 cents higher.  While this is certainly not supportive of the 
original theory of financial aid, it is not by itself a smoking gun since there are plausible explanations 
for why some schools might have higher costs than others (e.g., the  
location of the school, professor to student ratio, etc.).  These differences could also affect the amount 
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of state appropriations and the net tuition at the schools.  Thus, it would be inappropriate to inter-
pret this to mean that state appropriations increase the financial burden on families.  To get a better 
feel for the impact of state appropriations on affordability, we will look at the change in variables over 
time at a given school.  By comparing each school only to itself we can correct for a multitude of other 
explanatory factors.39   
Figure 17 shows the change in state appropriations per student and the change in average net tuition 
at each school from 2000 to 2005.  If financial aid worked according to the original model, we would 
expect for every dollar in state appropriations to reduce net tuition by one dollar.  Yet in reality, an-
other dollar of state appropriations is associated with a reduction in net tuition of only 15 cents.  
This is noteworthy in two respects.  First, in spite of suffering from omitted variable bias, this esti-
mate is remarkably similar to the findings of both Singell and Stone (2003) and Rizzo and Ehrenberg 
(2003), who control for a whole slew of factors.  Singell and Stone found that a “thousand dollar in-
crease in state appropriations (total endowment) per student is associated with a decrease in net tui-
tion of about $100.”40  Rizzo and Ehrenberg found that “it would take an increase of $1,000 in state 
appropriations per student to generate an in-state tuition reduction of $104.”41  Secondly, it is aston-
ishing because it implies that states spend $1,000 to save students $150 (or $100 or $104).   
Student Loans 
Student loans have grown in importance as a form of financial aid, with the College Board estimating 
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Figure 17:  Change in Appropriations and Net Tuition, 2000 to 
2005 
Source:  IPEDS, Note that only four-year public schools with FTE en-
rollment greater than 500, change in state appropriations per student 
between -$20,000 and $20,000 and change in net tuition less than 
$20,000 were included. 
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Figure 18: Change in Net Tuition and Loans at Public Schools, 
2000-2005  
Source:  IPEDS, Note that only four-year public schools with FTE en-
rollment greater than 500, change in net tuition of less than $20,000 
and change in average loan greater than -$2,000 were included. 
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Figure 19: Change in Net Tuition and Loans at Private Schools, 
2000-2005  
Source:  IPEDS, Note that only four-year private schools with FTE en-
rollment greater than 500, change in net tuition between -$10,000 
and $40,000 and change in student loans between -$5,000 and 
$15,000 were included. 
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that students borrowed a total of $85.9 billion for the 2007-2008 school year.42  What affect do these 
loans have on affordability? 
There is a tendency for schools where students borrow more to have a higher net tuition.  In fact, for 
every dollar of student loans, net tuition is $1.42 higher at public schools and $1.68 higher at private 
schools.  The fact that both figures are greater than 1 indicates that this finding is probably more 
useful in demonstrating the differences among schools than in drawing conclusions about the effect 
of student loans on affordability.  For instance, differences in the composition of the student body by 
income, with students from richer families going to more expensive schools, could well explain such a 
finding.   
Again, to control for all these idiosyncratic differences among schools, we’ll look at changes at the 
same school over time.  The results of this process are indicated in figures 18 and 19.  They indicate 
that an increase in the average student loan of $1 is associated with a net tuition that is $0.93 higher 
at public schools and $0.55 higher at private schools.   
This is disturbing. The evidence suggests that the out of pocket costs to students at public schools 
are hardly lowered at all with increased lending (tuition rises 93 cents for each dollar more provided 
in loans).  Neither the original nor the revised theory argue that loans should reduce net tuition 
(recall that net tuition is sticker price minus grants – loans are not subtracted), but the revised the-
ory notes that if loans are too widely available, they can contribute to the arms race which drives up 
costs and in turn tuition, and therefore reduces affordability.  These findings, that higher loan 
amounts are associated with higher tuition, are certainly consistent with the revised theory. 
The Impact of Current Financial Aid Programs on College Access 
The second main goal of financial aid is to increase access to college.  Many scholars have examined 
this issue and until recently, the historical evidence indicated “that a $1,000 change in college costs 
is associated with about a 5 percent difference in college enrollment rates.”43 Thus the consensus was 
that there was a “small, positive enrollment response to financial aid.”44  However, recent studies 
have begun to question this result, and find that there “is little to no persuasive evidence that the 
federal aid programs are… at all effective - in increasing the college enrollment of young people”45 and 
that “there was no disproportionate increase in enrollment.”46  
 One of the main reasons put forward for the meager response of enrollment to aid is that “the vast 
majority of the general public does not know what opportunities for aid exist, how to access the vari-
ous programs, and what one can expect to receive. As a result, students from poor families who 
would likely qualify for all or nearly all of the aid required to finance college fail to even apply.”47  
Moreover, even if they do apply, they don’t know what the outcome will be because “the aid process is 
not only complex but also highly uncertain.”48  While this analysis will not reexamine this issue in 
great detail, a couple of things are worth pointing out.   
First, states that provide more state appropriations per student do not have that many more of their 
high school graduates continuing on to college, as shown in figure 20.  While there is a positive trend, 
the correlation is very small – an increase in appropriations of $1,000 per student is only associated 
with 0.2% more high school graduates attending college. 
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Figure 20: State Appropriations and College Enrollment by 
State 
Source: Digest of Education Statistics 2007, Table 194 and State 
Higher Education Finance, FY 2007, Table 5.   
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Figure 21: Change in State Appropriations and Enrollment, 
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Source:  IPEDS, Note that only four-year public schools with FTE en-
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Kane (1995) offers one explanation for this low impact:  “Much of this money is pure transfer, re-
ceived by students who would have attended college in the absence of public support… Even using 
the large elasticities estimated in this paper, only 11 to 29% of the money invested in keeping public 
tuition low goes to marginal entrants.”49  In other words, much of the money from state appropria-
tions goes towards lowering tuition for existing students, rather than lowering tuition enough to at-
tract new students.   
A second point of interest is that at any given school, when state appropriations are increased, enroll-
ments tend to go down instead of up.  Figure 21 shows the change in state appropriations and 
change in enrollment from 2000 to 2005.  The negative slope indicates that as appropriations at ex-
isting schools increased, enrollments at those same schools tended to fall. Perhaps schools bundle 
higher appropriations with more restrictive enrollment policies in an attempt to “move to the next 
highest level” in terms of prestige.  At the very least, this indicates that if increases in college access 
are deemed desirable, entirely new institutions may be needed since existing ones have a tendency to 
contract in terms of access when given more resources.50   
The Impact of Current Financial Aid Programs on Equality of Opportunity 
While the previous sections demonstrated that price discrimination allows schools to increase their 
revenue, it is not clear for what these extra funds are used.  It is possible, and many schools claim, 
that they pursue a “high-tuition – high-aid” strategy not to enable them to increase spending in other 
areas, but to increase their aid budget in order to enroll more low-income students who would other-
wise be unable to attend.  Many schools claim that the extra tuition revenue will allow them to enroll 
more students from low-income backgrounds.  While it is true that more tuition revenue can be used 
to increase the financial aid budget for this purpose, the evidence is clear that in general, this is not 
the case.   
Data on the socioeconomic background of students is difficult to obtain, but, since the vast majority 
of federal grants like the Pell are restricted to students from low-income households, we can use the 
percentage of students receiving federal grants as a proxy of the enrollment share of low-income stu-
dents.  When doing so, it is apparent that schools with a high tuition rate enroll fewer low-income 
students.  In fact, at public schools, a $630 increase in tuition is associated with a 1% decrease in 
the percentage of students at a school that are from low-income families.  At private schools, the 
amount is $520. 
While it probably comes as no surprise that low income students are underrepresented at more ex-
pensive schools, it is welcome news that increases in tuition are not associated with further decreases 
in the enrollment of low-income students, almost certainly due to the availability of financial aid.  At 
public schools, tuition increases have virtually no impact on the proportion of low-income students 
enrolled, and at private schools, there is a slight positive effect, with high tuition leading to slightly 
more low-income students.   
However, schools that give more institutional aid are less likely to enroll a greater percentage of low-
income students.  In fact, as the average amount of institutional aid increases, the percentage of low-
income students at the school declines.  This is consistent with conventional wisdom that states that 
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Figure 22: Change in Institutional Aid and Percent of Low-
income Students at Public Schools, 2000-2005  
Source:  IPEDS, Note that only four-year public schools with FTE en-
rollment greater than 500 and change in institutional aid between -
1,000 and 2,500 were included. 
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Figure 23: Change in Institutional Aid and Percent of Low-
income Students at Private Schools, 2000-2005   
Source:  IPEDS Note that only four-year private schools with FTE en-
rollment greater than 500 and change in institutional aid between -
5,000 and 10,000 were included. 
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students from low income families often suffer from sticker shock (high prices discourage them from 
even applying) and that many schools are engaged in aid wars, where merit aid is used to lure prom-
ising students to the school.  At some schools where the goal of prestige (derived from having more 
good students) conflicts with the goal of increased access, increased access often loses out.    
Figures 22 and 23 compare the change in institutional aid to the change in enrollment of low-income 
students from 2000 to 2005.  Changes in institutional aid have a slight positive effect on the enroll-
ment share of low-income students at public schools, and a slight negative effect at private schools.  
In other words, changes in the amount of institutional aid given to students have virtually no impact 
on the share of low-income students enrolled.  While this may or may not mean that schools are lying 
when they say they are pursuing a “high-tuition, high-aid” strategy, it does mean that if they are pur-
suing such a strategy, they are not succeeding.   
Since expensive schools also tend to be ‘better’ schools, it seems as though low-income students get 
shut out of many of the best schools.  The absence of low-income students cannot be blamed entirely 
on the colleges.  For instance, behavioral economists have “concluded that people's choices are 
strongly influenced by the default provided them... [and]  the default option for low-income students 
is to not go to college.”51  But neither are colleges entirely blameless.  As Kevin Carey has said, it’s 
generally not “a case of screwing poor students by overcharging them.  Instead, it’s a case of screwing 
poor students by not admitting them in the first place.”52 
Recommendations for Reforming Financial Aid 
The fundamental lesson to draw from this analysis is that financial aid needs to be designed in a way 
that does not contribute to the arms race in spending.  The arms race is driven by the fact that insti-
tutions have little incentive to try to hold down costs.  Rather, each continues to focus on attracting 
more resources so that it can maintain and try to improve both its absolute quality and its relative 
position…53 
Because current financial aid practices do not take this into account, they end up contributing to the 
problem.  If the goal is to increase equality of opportunity, then financial aid in the form of lump sum 
subsidies and widespread loans will only be partially effective, and may even be counterproductive.  
The burden for low-income students may be lowered, but the burden on many will not be affected 
(those who can pay more than TE in figure 4).  To avoid contributing to the arms race, grants and 
loans need to be restricted to low-income students exclusively.  Any aid made available to students 
who can already pay for the cost of attendance will simply encourage schools to try and ‘capture’ that 
aid, which will then be used to fuel the arms race. 
Some will note that increasing revenues for colleges is not necessarily bad.  For some colleges, par-
ticularly two-year schools, I would tend to agree.  But for the most part, I think diminishing returns 
set in long ago, and that additional revenue is unlikely to be spent in ways that improve educational 
outcomes, though perhaps I am giving too much credence to the following examples of how schools 
have recently decided to spend money: 
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• The University of Illinois spent $6 million on the Irwin Academic Services Center which “helps 
only about 550 of the school's 37,000 students” because it is restricted to athletes.  But, “at 
least four other schools have multimillion-dollar tutoring centers just for their athletes” in-
cluding the $12 million facility at the University of Michigan.54 
• Princeton built a $136 million, 500-bed dorm ($272,000 per bed, much more than the median 
home costs).55  MIT’s Simmons Hall cost $194,000 per bed.56 
• “Framingham State College will spend more than $191,000 building a two-car garage and 
stone patio for its state-owned president's house …even as the college's budget faces a poten-
tial $2 million cut”57 
• The University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey “spent  more  than  $80,000  in  2005  
to  shuttle  the  head  of  a  volunteer advisory board from her home in Pennsylvania’s Po-
conos to the school’s Newark campus.”58 
• “Students now get massages, pedicures and manicures at the University of Wisconsin in Osh-
kosh” and students at Indiana University of Pennsylvania can play “one of 52 golf courses 
from around the world on the room-sized golf simulators”59 
• Ohio State University spent $140 million60 “to build what its peers enviously refer to as the 
Taj Mahal, a 657,000-square-foot complex featuring kayaks and canoes, indoor batting cages 
and ropes courses, massages and a climbing wall big enough for 50 students to scale simulta-
neously”61 
• The University of California gave 16 employees severance checks, and then rehired them.  In 
the most egregious example, one person “left her old job on April 30 and began her new one 
on May 1.”  She was given the same salary, but managed to collect a $100,202 severance pay-
ment anyway.  And prior to this she was given “a $44,000 relocation allowance and a low-
interest $832,500 home loan, for which she was not otherwise entitled.”62 
• In 2006-2007, 293 employees at private schools made more than $500,000.  “[T]he highest-
paid college employee in the country was Pete Carroll, head football coach at the University of 
Southern California, with $4.4-million in total compensation (pay plus benefits).”63 
Perhaps I have not fully developed the requisite comfort level with cognitive dissonance to constantly 
hear schools complaining about not having enough money and then witness them spending the 
money they do have like this. The problems of higher education that lead to the arms race will ulti-
mately need to be addressed (by developing measures of outputs rather than inputs), but in the 
meantime, the key issue with respect to financial aid is how to avoid exacerbating these problems.   
The recommendations below are based on the propositions that it is socially desirable to: 1) enable 
more people to attend college than otherwise would; 2) reduce the financial burden on students and 
their families; and 3) promote equality of opportunity.  These three goals are the primary rationale for 
government provided financial aid.64  
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These can be accomplished by shifting the current practice of providing subsides to all students, 
loans to most students, and grants to some students, to a system that relies on means-tested grants 
and loans exclusively.  
The first step is to determine the cost of providing an education.   Note that this is not the cost of pro-
viding an education at a particular institution, but rather the cost in general of providing an educa-
tion.  In The $7,376 “Ives”: Value-Designed Models of Undergraduate Education, an earlier CCAP pub-
lication, Vance Fried estimated that a first rate education could be delivered for $7,376 per year.65   
Alternatively, we could examine the total actual expenditures of schools.  A new report by the Delta 
Project determined that in 2006, per FTE student education and related spending (this is known as 
the “full cost of education” and includes instructional spending as well as an allowance for other 
costs) varied from $33,234 at private research schools to $10,835 at public masters’ schools.66  The 
median student attends a public research university, which had education and related costs of 
$13,819 per student.  We will use this figure and the corresponding figure for two-year schools of 
$9,184 as our baseline.  In 2008 dollars, these work out to $14,758 and $9,808 respectively.  Thus, 
the cost of educating a student at a four-year school is about $15,000, and the cost of educating a 
student at a two-year school is about $10,000.  We’ll call these figures C*.  
As an aside, an extremely good case can be made that in the absence of proof of educational differ-
ences, the baseline should be the spending of the lowest cost provider – e.g. the public masters’ fig-
ures.  Since we do not measure the output of schools, there is no way of knowing if they are providing 
any worse of an education than top spending schools, so why should we pay more for something 
without knowing it is any better?   Using those figures would also encourage high spending schools 
to come up with output measures to try and justify their high costs, something that they currently 
resist tooth and nail.  However, for the purpose of this illustration, I conservatively chose to use the 
median spending figure, which is certainly defensible given that half of students already attend 
schools that spend that amount or less.   
In the second step, the government figures out what each student can afford to pay.  This is already 
being done, and the figure is called the “expected family contribution” or EFC.  While this formula is 
undoubtedly in need of revision (the “current formula absorbs student earnings from work … at a 
very high rate of 50 percent,”67 which is outrageous), there is no reason in principle that it could not 
be fixed and amended for these purposes.  Importantly, the government should not share this informa-
tion with the schools – there is little to be gained by facilitating price discrimination.      
Next, simply take the difference between the two, and have the federal and state governments provide 
“Super Pell” grants for as much of the difference as they can.  If a student’s EFC is $10,000, and the 
cost of providing an education, C*, is $15,000 at a four year school, then the student should be eligi-
ble for $5,000 in financial aid.  Given current and projected budgetary strains, it is possible that even 
the state and federal government combined would not be able to fully fund these “Super Pells” for 
every student, so federally sponsored loans could be used to fill in the gap.  Note however, that, if 
used at all, the loans should not be made available to everyone, just to those whose EFC and Super 
Pell still do not cover C*.68 
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The results of this process are depicted in fig-
ure 24.  The idea is to allow all students to 
pay tuition equal to C*.  Students from 0 to QN 
can pay this amount, and are not given aid.  
However, students from QN to QMax cannot pay 
C* on their own, and receive grants and loans 
sufficient to cover the amount that they can-
not pay.   
This is only a slight departure from current 
practice for the federal government.  Federal 
grants are already restricted to low-income 
students, so no fundamental modification is 
necessary with respect to grants.  Federally 
backed loans on the other hand, are not re-
stricted to low-income students and are cur-
rently too widely available (while there are 
generally income limits, these limits are well 
above C*).  Loans made to students who can 
afford to pay more than C* are ineffective in reducing the financial burden for students and merely 
result in the school capturing more money.  Thus the federal loans need to be restricted so that they 
are only available to students that cannot afford to pay C*.  The big changes in the practice of the 
federal government concerns the FAFSA and the tuition tax credits.  The FAFSA information should 
not be given to schools.  This will help reduce price discrimination, since without the FAFSA informa-
tion schools will not know as much about the demand curve.  The tax credits have a similar effect as 
loans (they shift the demand curve out) but because they primarily benefit upper and middle income 
families, who are most likely to be above C*, they are probably largely ineffective in reducing the fi-
nancial burden of college.  They effectively take money that would have been paid in taxes, and trans-
fer it to colleges.  In this respect, the expanded tuition tax credits in the 2009 stimulus bill are proba-
bly a step backward with respect to reforming the system.  
Note that this is a significant departure from contemporary practice for states.  Currently, states tend 
to fund public institutions directly through lump sum subsides (rhetoric sometimes refers to this as a 
per student subsidy, but the amount provided changes over the years in a manner much more con-
sistent with states figuring out the total amount they can afford and then calculating the per student 
rate as opposed to changing the per student rate based on some other criteria).  However, states then 
impose restrictions on the schools, such as limiting the amount that they can charge in tuition.  
Thus states try to exert pressure on the public schools along both the price and quantity dimensions.  
This proposal recommends the abandonment of this system.  Instead, public schools would face no 
pressure on either price or quantity, and would enjoy more autonomy.  However, the schools would 
no longer receive direct appropriations/subsidies, and money would be given directly to the students 
rather than to the schools. 
A worrisome objection to this proposal is that “[m]eans-tested aid is better targeted but, it seems, less 
Figure 24: A Better Financial Aid Design 
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effective in promoting college enrollment”69,70 than across the board subsidies.  However, it is my be-
lief that this is due to the complex and convoluted financial aid process.  This proposal would elimi-
nate virtually all of that process, and result in predictable and prior knowledge about aid, which 
would reduce the uncertainty and confusion that currently prevents many students who would qual-
ify for aid from getting it.71  Even supposing I am wrong on this point, this proposal would still be 
more effective than current policy in the long run.  Since “the best financial aid is lower tuition,”72 
and this proposal would end the arms race, it stands to reason that over time tuition would be lower 
under this proposal than under the status quo. 
Conclusion 
Several key parts of current financial aid practice are ineffective in achieving their primary goals 
(promoting college affordability, access, and equality of opportunity) because aid is often structured 
in such a way that it reinforces undesirable traits within the higher education sector.  Specifically, 
financial aid programs fuel an arms race in spending among schools.  Programs are structured in 
such a way that governments are essentially subsidizing the inflation of college costs. 
Schools generally cannot compete with each other by demonstrating that they provide a better educa-
tion than others, because the outputs of school (learning and its consequences in a value added 
sense) are not measured.  Since there are not generally accepted measures of outputs, and it is rea-
sonable to think that high quality inputs will lead to high quality outputs, schools compete on inputs 
instead.  Any input that is plausibly thought to affect learning (superstar faculty, world class labora-
tories, fancy dorms, etc.) becomes the focus of competition, and each school tries to have the best 
inputs.  The result has variously been described as the Bowen Rule, the Ehrenberg Cookie Monster, 
or more generally the academic arms race, and it inevitably leads to an explosion in costs.  Is it any 
wonder that when we measure schools based on inputs, which are costly, that costs continually rise? 
Perhaps the most important consequence of the resulting explosion in costs has been a reduction in 
college affordability and access.  As costs have been ratcheted up, governments have been forced to 
cut back on funding (as a percent of total costs), which is increasingly leaving the financial burden on 
students and their families.  In other words, policy makers have designed a convoluted financial aid 
system that inadvertently leads to higher tuition.  However, if ineffective practices are terminated or 
altered, and effective practices are expanded, then the system will be able to achieve its goal of mak-
ing college less of a financial burden. 
Ultimately, the dilemma is how to ensure equality of opportunity (that qualified low-income students 
have the financial aid they need to allow them to attend college), without contributing to the aca-
demic arms race.  The recommendations above are a step in that direction.   
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